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High-occupancy toll (HOT) lanes—an increasingly popular solution for 
congested roadway networks—give drivers the option to access express 
lanes. The cost of entry often varies with demand, although no standard 
method of optimizing these price points exists. Using the principles of a 
Vickrey auction that incentivizes true-value bids, this paper proposes a 
tolling system that uses vehicle-to-infrastructure technology to optimize 
toll operator revenue with HOT lane usage. In the scenario, a roadway 
network consists of a HOT lane and a general-purpose lane, each with 
identical physical properties. Drivers can access the HOT lane at the start 
of the facility or at one interim point along the roadway. With the use of a 
triangular distribution to approximate the distribution of travelers’ value 
of time (VOT), the model explores the impact of varying the distribution’s 
mode on revenue earned by the toll operator. Results from the model indi-
cate that when the toll operator maximizes the model’s revenue, the per-
centage of auction bids accepted for toll road access is robust to changes 
in the VOT distribution. This percentage equates to approximately 17% 
of vehicles accessing the facility. Given the difficulty in obtaining actual 
travelers’ distribution of VOT, this auction tolling mechanism implies that 
obtaining an exact VOT distribution may not be necessary for this type 
of tolling analysis.
Wireless technology increasingly incorporates everyday appliances 
such as televisions, refrigerators, and even doorbells. Personal vehi-
cles are no exception to this wireless expansion, or “Internet of things,” 
with companies like OnStar offering emergency and security vehicle-
to-infrastructure (V2I) capabilities over cellular phone networks. The 
evolving nature of V2I technology expands the possibilities for new 
applications, such as the participation of travelers in auctions to access 
toll roads in which bids are placed via V2I devices (1). This paper con-
siders such an application in a simple traffic scenario with dynamic 
auction tolling. The mathematical model developed here shows the 
impact of varying the distribution of travelers’ (customers’) value of 
time (VOT) on overall travel time and bid acceptance policies. The 
results indicate that the proposed auction mechanism is invariant to the 
VOT distribution and therefore potentially allows future researchers 
to reduce their concerns about obtaining an exact VOT distribution 
for tolling models.
The next section gives a brief background on tolling and auctions. 
An overview of transportation and revenue management theory, 
which forms the backbone of this analysis, follows. These theories 
are then framed as an optimization problem to analyze the distribu-
tion of travelers’ VOT. The paper concludes by quantifying abstract 
variables and solving the optimization problem, giving insight into 
the use of Vickrey auction schemes for dynamic V2I tolling scenarios.
Background
As volumes on transportation networks increase, factors such as 
environmental constraints, right-of-way issues, societal impacts, and 
reduced public funding limit the ability and attractiveness of reducing 
congestion by constructing new roads (2). When new facility expan-
sion and construction are not options, planners must employ alternative 
strategies. One popular strategy is the use of high-occupancy vehicle 
(HOV) lanes. Adopting this strategy requires at least two key com-
ponents, namely, the availability of an extra lane for HOV travel and 
a way to ensure optimal use of the dedicated lane. To maximize the 
potential flow improvements provided by HOV lanes, some locales 
expand the eligible vehicles to include hybrid electric cars and toll-
paying customers. HOV lanes combined with tolls are called high-
occupancy toll (HOT) lanes. The first HOT lane was implemented in 
1995 on SR-91 in Orange County, California (3).
Tolling can help relieve congestion while generating funds for 
transportation infrastructure improvements and is thus likely to 
become more prevalent in the future. Poole points out that most major 
Interstate corridors were built in the 1960s and 1970s with a 50-year 
life span and are nearing the end of their expected service (4). Poole 
estimates that revitalizing these roads will cost $3.14 trillion over 
the next 30 years. Tolling might be the only viable means to fund 
this extensive project, and thus it represents an important facet of 
transportation research.
With the use of nondisruptive technology (e.g., E-ZPass) that auto-
matically bills the toll road user and eliminates the need for stopping at 
tollbooths, tolls are becoming easier and more efficient to use. Given 
the developments in tolling technology and the increasing adoption 
of this congestion reduction strategy, more research must investi-
gate available tolling policies. Combining the use of mathematical 
modeling of tolling mechanisms (5–8) with studies on V2I for traffic 
management (9), this paper examines a scenario in which driverless 
vehicles allow travelers to bid in a live auction for tolls on HOT lanes 
by using V2I technology. The following sections provide explana-
tions of current tolling mechanisms and then describe the scenario and 
research methodology.
Tolling Mechanisms
Two important elements of modeling tolls are the tolling mecha-
nism and customer utility. The tolling mechanism has traditionally 
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taken the form of a fixed cost for using the toll road; customer util-
ity involves a VOT equation with customers’ choices modeled in a 
variety of ways (3).
Traditionally, toll roads have fixed prices. One advantage to this 
approach is that drivers and customers know what to expect and can 
prepare for the payment amount. As nondisruptive payment methods, 
such as E-ZPass, become more common, automated tolling mech-
anisms reduce the need for tollbooths and introduce the potential 
for varying toll prices. Dynamic price points for tolls reflect preset 
time intervals, such as rush hour, or real-time response to conges-
tion. Examples of real-world dynamic tolls include the San Diego 
I-15 FasTrak, which changes the toll price every 17 min during peak 
periods; the Orange County, California, SR-91 tolls, which change 
every hour; the Minnesota I-394 tolls, which change as frequently as 
every 3 min; and the I-95 express toll lanes in Florida, which change 
the toll price every 15 min (7).
An adjustable tolling mechanism allows control over the number 
of vehicles using the roadway or HOT lane. Setting a toll price too 
low leads to overutilization, congestion, and degradation in service 
quality. Setting the price too high will discourage use and lead to 
underutilization of the HOT lane and less-than-optimal congestion 
relief for the general-purpose (GP) lanes. This paper contributes to 
the theoretical and practical study of tolling mechanisms to ensure 
that an optimal number of vehicles enter the toll lane both to relieve 
congestion and to maximize revenue (6).
Literature on tolling mechanisms reveals a variety of approaches to 
maximizing revenue. Cheng and Ishak developed a feedback mecha-
nism for maximizing toll revenue while ensuring that the toll road 
maintained a minimum speed of 45 mph or higher, which they tested 
in a PTV VISSIM simulation (7). Zhang et al. initially followed a 
similar approach (10). Subsequent research by Zhang et al. adapted 
this approach to include control theory, in which a proportional inte-
gral and derivative algorithm was used to control oscillations in flows 
and to make a smoother ride for toll lane users (8). Wie applied the 
Stackelberg leadership model from game theory to solve dynamic toll 
schedules for a specified subset of arcs with bottlenecks on a con-
gested traffic network (5). Shepherd and Balijepalli modeled the use 
of toll pricing as a means for cities in competition with one another 
to attract new residents (11, 12). Their results indicated that compe-
tition resulted in unfavorable tolling strategies for both cities. Friesz 
et al. presented a sophisticated method for dynamic congestion pric-
ing; however, they faced computationally intensive and difficult 
implementation (13). The problem of computational intensity, known 
as the curse of dimensionality, plagues many techniques developed to 
study congestion pricing. The complex nature of the studies described 
here highlights the difficulty in optimizing vehicle use of the toll road.
Toll price determination usually focuses on the relationship between 
customers (travelers) and toll operators. With V2I technology, the 
potential exists for the toll operator to directly interface with trav-
elers in real time in response to road conditions. The toll operator 
would respond to higher or lower demand by raising or lowering the 
price accordingly. Times of high volume, however, leave little room 
for error in determining the toll price. Setting the price too low could 
lead to congestion on the toll road beyond that of the GP lanes and, in 
turn, to customer dissatisfaction. Rather than allowing the toll opera-
tor to allocate eligible access to the toll road randomly when demand 
is higher than capacity, this study proposes the use of an auction to 
determine which vehicles will pay what price to enter the HOT lane.
The following auction mechanism is proposed to adjust toll 
amounts dynamically on the basis of travelers’ demonstrated valu-
ation of road use provided by V2I technology by placing bids for 
the maximum amount they are willing to pay to use the toll road, an 
amount roughly equivalent to their individual value of time. The toll 
operator then determines a cutoff price for bids on the basis of the 
number of vehicles that can be admitted to the road without exceed-
ing desired density levels. This version of the auction mechanism 
is a one-shot auction, but an auction can be run in many different 
ways. [An overview of standard auction types appears in Teodorović 
et al. (14) and in Dash et al. (15)]. Different auction mechanisms 
will result in different revenue payouts to the auctioneer, so tolling 
mechanisms should adapt to suit the needs of the specific scenario.
This research incorporates the mechanism of a Vickrey auction, 
which works by allowing the auctioneer to set a cutoff for the num-
ber of winning bids and then accepting that number of the highest 
bids. The final price given to the winners is equal to the highest bid 
that was not accepted (or slightly above it) (16). The proxy bidding 
system of the eBay website is similar to a Vickrey auction. The advan-
tage of this auction mechanism is that it disincentivizes outbidding 
behavior when auction participants attempt to cheat the system. 
Instead, consumers tend to bid their perceived values of the prod-
uct, leading to realistic valuation of the auction item, in this case, 
toll prices. This mechanism design allows for multiple bids from 
travelers but creates some challenges discussed later.
Although the Nobel Prize–winning economist Williams Vickrey 
published research on both congestion pricing problems (17) and 
auction theory (16) in the 1960s, he did not connect the two together 
at the time. This lack of connection likely resulted from the infeasi-
bility of bidding while driving and the lack of means to organize bid 
outcomes in real time, problems that modern technology solves. 
With the potential use of V2I technology and driverless vehicles, 
conducting a tolling auction during transit is now feasible. Until now, 
research connecting Vickrey’s two groundbreaking ideas has focused 
on bidding before travel rather than bidding while traveling. For exam-
ple, Teodorović et al. proposed an auction-based congestion pricing 
scheme for people to bid on entry to a downtown area in a weeklong 
period to which the bidders wish to make one or more visits (14). The 
researchers produced a mixed-integer program problem and solved 
it by using heuristics. The study did not consider V2I technology.
Recently, Zhou and Saigal considered V2I-facilitated auctions 
and used a combinatorial auction approach to process bids from an 
interconnected toll road network (1). Combinatorial auctions allow 
bidders to bid on different or even multiple but overlapping items, 
such as an interconnected toll network (18). The mechanism that 
Zhou and Saigal (1) used is called the VCG named after Vickrey 
(16), Clarke (19), and Groves (20). The VCG works by first decid-
ing which bids maximize revenue and then determining the bid 
price. This price is based on the difference between the revenue 
gained if the bidder’s bid was accepted and the theoretical revenue 
gained if the bid was not accepted (i.e., if a bid was not accepted, 
then other bids might be accepted instead). The VCG approach is 
very computationally intensive and is NP-hard (14).
This research connects Vickrey’s auction mechanism with V2I tech-
nology to optimize revenue and lane usage without requiring excessive 
computation. This process first requires quantification of the driving 
behavior factors considered to evaluate efficiency and customer satis-
faction. The following section establishes the customer utility aspect 
of this type of tolling mechanism.
customer Evaluation of Time
The majority of tolling research, including this study, uses the con-
cept of VOT for determining how much travelers are willing to 
pay. VOT is a linear multiplying constant that relates time saved to 
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a monetary value. The authors accept that using VOT has several 
drawbacks, including that it does not take into account the complex 
factors in human decision making. For example, travelers’ VOT 
reflects time of day, as indicated by the VOT for the I-395 HOT lane 
in Minnesota that varied from $73/h in the morning to $116/h in the 
afternoon (21). Drivers also exhibit a perception bias toward tolls of 
about 15 to 20 min for which they will accept an increase in travel 
time to avoid a toll (22). In addition, research suggests that travel-
ers value time savings more on longer trips (22) and that they are 
willing to accept time-varying toll charges only if those charges can 
yield more-reliable journey times (23). These factors could explain 
why Cho et al. discovered a limited correlation between time saved 
and proportion of travelers using HOT lanes (21). These human fac-
tors indicate that VOT may require the addition of a constant value. 
Michalaka et al. presented more complex examinations of VOT by 
using artificial intelligence techniques to learn travelers’ dynamic 
VOT with data from the I-95 Express in Florida, but this issue is 
beyond the scope of the current study (2).
In this model, VOT is secondary to the auction pricing mechanism, 
the primary area of inquiry here. For that reason, the inability of VOT 
to capture more complex human decision-making processes is out-
weighed by the simplicity of the approach. In this study, the hetero-
geneity of VOT, rather than the actual function, is the most important 
aspect of this measure.
customer choice Models
A final aspect of consumer behavior incorporated into the model 
involves determining how drivers make the choice to participate 
in dynamic tolling auctions. In the literature on toll participation, 
the favored approach is to use logit choice models (24) to replicate 
human decision making about whether to take the toll road (7, 10). 
Gardner et al. did a comparative study of customer choice models 
and concluded that the Burr distribution was the best fit for customer 
choice (3). The model in the current paper assumes that every traveler 
has a value for the time-saving aspect of using the toll road (even if 
that value is zero), so every vehicle places a bid. This feature means 
that a traveler’s only choice in this model is the amount of his or her 
bid, which the authors assume is based on that traveler’s VOT.
ModEl dEsign
The research presented in this paper considers a simple tolling sce-
nario (Figure 1) to investigate the impact of assuming different esti-
mates of VOT distribution on both the toll operator’s revenue and 
the travel times of the vehicles in the system.
scenario
The scenario involves a single origin–destination pair, AC, con-
nected by a GP road and a toll road. At the midway point between 
nodes A and C is an interchange B between the toll road and the GP 
road (Figure 1). The authors assume that movement between the two 
roads at the intersection is smooth and does not interfere with the 
flow of traffic. All segments are identical in length and capacity. Thus, 
given the same vehicle volume, travel time is the same on all road 
segments. The total volume of vehicles is normalized to equal one 
without loss of generality.
Unlike in traditional fixed-tolling mechanisms, travelers in this 
scenario bid to use the toll road, and the toll operator determines 
which bids are accepted. The travelers initially place two bids: one 
for use of the toll road from A to C without interruption, b(AC), and 
one for the toll road from A to B, b(AB). If a traveler’s b(AC) bid 
is accepted, that traveler’s other bids are nullified. Travelers whose 
initial b(AC) bids are not accepted are provided the opportunity to 
bid for the BC segment; thus, three potential bidding opportunities 
are available. A traveler may get to use the toll road for the complete 
journey even if his b(AC) bid is rejected, as his b(AB) and b(BC) 
bids might be accepted.
Toll or HOT lane operation policies may have multiple objectives. 
The most common are to maximize throughput of the entire freeway 
(both GP and toll lanes) and to provide free-flow traffic service on the 
toll lane. The authors assume in this scenario that the toll operator’s 
only objective is to maximize revenue from the tolls collected. Thus, 
the operator is not concerned with minimizing overall travel time or 
maximizing road efficiency.
This scenario assumes that all vehicles and toll operators have 
the V2I technology required for this process to occur. In addition, it 
assumes that all vehicles can place bids before reaching the selec-
tion nodes A and B and that no slowdown from a vehicle entering or 
exiting a toll lane occurs. The final assumption is that all travelers 
are able to honor their bids.
The following sections describe the three parts required to pro-
duce a complete toll model: the link travel time function, the bidding 
mechanism, and the customer’s VOT.
link Travel Time Function
As VOT is directly related to bids placed by travelers, the time 
required to transverse the network and the effects of congestion are 
critical. The U.S. Bureau of Public Roads uses a standard equation 
for congestion on road segments, shown in Equation 1, the use of 
which is also supported by Teodorović et al. (14). This equation is 
based on Greenshields’s fundamental diagram of traffic flow (25):
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where
 t = travel time of link l for traffic volume v,
 tff = free-flow travel time, and
 c = road segment capacity.
Justified by its acceptance in congestion and tolling studies, this 
equation will also inform model development for this study.
Bidding Mechanism
Because the entire bidding process in this scenario occurs over 
wireless V2I technology, this system has two decision makers, the 
FIGURE 1  Node–arc diagram of 
scenario transportation network.
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traveler and the toll operator. Equations 2 and 3 represent the deci-
sions of travelers. The decision of the toll operator is discussed in 
the section on the model. On the basis of individual VOT, travelers 
will place bids for access to toll road segments. The authors assume 
that travelers have perfect knowledge about travel time on the road 
segments and are thus able to determine the travel time savings of 
using the toll road. The justification for this perfect knowledge is 
the assumption that regularly commuting travelers along the road 
would likely be able to make accurate estimates of travel time on the 
basis of current conditions. By using a Vickrey auction mechanism, 
travelers lack incentive to bid anything other than their true esti-
mates of the toll price. From these assumptions, the bidding formula 
for travelers for arc AB in Equation 2 is based on the difference in 
travel times between the GP and the toll lanes:
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )= −b x u x t v t vAB, AB , AB AB , AB (2)GP GP toll toll
where x is the traveler and u is the VOT. The advantage of using 
this bidding equation is that it stops the scenario when the toll oper-
ator simply accepts all bids. Such a condition would make the toll 
road’s congestion worse than that of the GP lane and lead travelers 
to bid zero.
( ) ( ) ( )= +b x b x b xAC, AB, BC, (3)
A variation of Equation 2 can also be used for bids of the BC road 
segment. Determining bids for using the toll road all the way from A 
to C, b(AC), is trickier because it involves multiple road segments 
(Equation 3). The authors assume that this bid considers only travel 
time savings and therefore means that it relates to Equation 2. This 
estimate of the AC bid may be problematic and will be discussed in 
the section on results.
Travelers’ VoT distribution
The model assumes that travelers propose heterogeneous bids; other-
wise, everyone would bid the same amount. Here a method for 
modeling travelers’ VOT is established. This step means that each 
traveler will have a different VOT defined as u(x) in Equation 2. 
Thus, the distribution of the traveler’s VOT needs to be defined. 
Without any estimate of the distribution of VOT, the model leans 
toward parsimony and applies a simple triangular distribution. The 
triangular distribution allows the setting of a minimum VOT (i.e., 
zero) and a maximum VOT (as even billionaires have limits on their 
VOT). Unlike the uniform distribution, the triangular distribution also 
allows the setting of an average, the mode. Then this mode can be 
varied to produce different distributions (Figure 2). Other functions, 
like the beta function, achieve this variability but require more com-
plex implementation. The triangular function is used in other trans-
portation models as an approximation of relationships like flow to 
density (2). Because the function is continuous, the authors assume 
that the number of vehicles is continuous and not discrete. To simplify 
the mathematics, the number of vehicles is normalized to one.
ModEl
Here the model is developed that helps the second set of decision 
makers, the toll operators, who decide which bids to accept given 
the travelers’ bidding strategies discussed earlier. Because of the 
structure of Vickrey auctions, the accepted price for toll road access 
is the value of the lowest accepted bid—or highest nonaccepted 
bid in the continuous case. The toll operator then faces a dilemma: 
as more vehicles are accepted, the number of payments collected 
increases, but the toll price for each is lower. The toll operator must 
balance the number of vehicles accepted against the actual toll price 
paid. In addition, the more vehicles that are accepted onto the toll 
road, the less attractive it is to drivers (more vehicles mean slower 
travel times), so they will lower their initial bids. The toll operator 
must consider these factors to maximize toll revenue.
The toll operator must make three decisions:
•	 The number of bids to accept for use of the entire length of the 
toll road, b(AC);
•	 The number of bids to accept for only the first toll segment, 
b(AB); and
•	 The number of bids to accept for only the last toll segment, b(BC).
The authors assume that the toll operator takes the highest bids 
available for each segment and that the operator prefers bids for 
b(AC) over those for b(AB), as more guaranteed revenue is gener-
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FIGURE 2  Various versions of triangular distribution with 
minimum of zero and maximum of one.
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where
	 λ = proportion of travelers whose b(AC) bid is accepted,
	 θ = proportion of travelers whose b(AB) bid is accepted,
	 µ = proportion of travelers whose b(BC) bid is accepted,
 F =  cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the triangular 
distribution,
 f =  probability distribution function (PDF) of the triangular 
distribution,
 umax = upper bound of the triangular distribution, and
 umod = distribution’s mode.
The vehicles are identified by their associated VOT; thus, u(x) = x 
here; because the vehicles are represented as continuous variables, 
their VOTs are unique. The constraints ensure that no more vehicles 
are allocated to the arc ABtoll and BCtoll than the number of vehicles in 
the system (which was normalized to one). The three integrals show 
the total revenue generated from the three groups: those accepted for 
travel on the complete toll road and those accepted for travel on only 
one of the two segments. The price paid by each vehicle in a particular 
group is constant and is equal to the lowest bid offered for that group. 
Thus, the equation can be simplified to the following:




( ) ( )
( )
λ − λ + θ − θ + λ
+ µ − µ + λ
[ ]θ µ λ∈
− −
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Before the optimization equation is further manipulated, some 
simplifying assumptions are made. The authors have assumed that 
all the arcs are identical, and the free-flow travel is normalized 
to get Tff{•} = 1. The travel time equation requires the volume of 
traffic, which is assumed to be just the proportion of vehicles that 
use that particular arc. This assumption means that discrete traffic 
flow is also assumed as is the fact that the number of vehicles is 
continuous. Further assumed is that capacity is c{•} = 1, which 
means that no arc can have more than the full capacity of vehicles 
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Equation 6 reduces the number of additive parts of Equation 5 
from three to two; this reduction occurs because of the relation of 
the bids given in Equation 3. At this stage, Equation 6 could use any 
probability distribution for the travelers’ VOT. The final stage of the 
manipulation of the optimization equation is to substitute the tri-
angular distribution into it. The triangular distribution’s cumulative 
distribution function is continuous but involves different functional 
parts for each side of the mode value. To keep the equations simple, 
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Under these constraints, one side of the triangular distribution needs 
to be considered. Thus
( ) ( )− = − −− iF x u x u u u1 (8)1 max max max mod
This arrangement means that the new constraints become
( )
( )
θ + λ ≤
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Substituting Equation 8 into Equation 6 results in the following 
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The equation was numerically solved by using the NMaximize func-
tion in Mathematica 10 (www.wolfram.com/mathematica/), which 
was set at a precision of five significant figures of accuracy. The 
NMaximize function runs various heuristic methods to find the solu-
tion to the level of accuracy required. These methods include simu-
lated annealing (26) and the Nelder–Mead method (27). Using this 
heuristic, the authors explored the effects of varying the VOT tri-
angular distribution on model results. This exploration was achieved 
by varying the umod value from 0.0 to 0.9. The results are shown in 






















































































FIGURE 3  Graph showing results from varying mode value of 
VOT distribution for both revenue generated and proportion of 
vehicles allowed on toll road.
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Varying the umod value produces very different distributions. For 
example, the triangular distribution with a umod = 0.9 is the oppo-
site (mirror image) of one with a umod = 0.1. Given these differ-
ences, the numerical solutions showed surprisingly similar results, 
except for umod > 0.8. The argument solution to all these cases 
was approximately λ = 0.076, θ = 0.095, µ = 0.095 with a revenue 
generated of 0.02. The argument solutions translate to the percent-
age of vehicles allowed on the toll road, which is approximately 
17% on both toll segments. The revenue is a little more complex to 
understand and requires an explicit example: consider a situation 
in which each toll segment takes a half hour to travel at free-flow 
speed and maximum VOT is $100/h saved. Then the revenue gen-
erated per 6,000 vehicles entering the system (either on the toll road 
or the GP lanes) is $12,000 (by assuming that capacity is greater 
than 6,000 vehicles), with an average charge of approximately $11 
per vehicle.
The trend does not continue for umod > 0.8 because of an analytical 
limitation placed on the model. The authors assumed (to simplify the 
equations) that only vehicles whose VOT > umod would be considered 
for acceptance, an assumption that resulted in some constraints given 
in Equation 9. When umod < 0.8, these constraints hold for the optimal 
solution; however, as umod increases beyond this point, these con-
straints limit the number of vehicles whose bids can be accepted and 
thus result in a reduction in overall revenue and number of vehicles 
accepted.
It might have been expected that the toll operator would only 
accept AC bids and not any bids from AB or BC. However, accept-
ing bids from both groups allows the toll operator to get a higher 
toll price for the AC group (in accordance with the Vickrey auction 
mechanism) in addition to the revenue generated by the AB and BC 
groups. Thus, the toll operator can charge more to those willing to 
pay more for complete access to both toll road segments as well as 
make money from secondary customers. This strategy is quite com-
mon in airline pricing, for which a large difference usually exists 
between the price of a business class ticket and an economy class 
ticket (24).
For all umod, θ = µ, which implies that the same group of vehicles 
gets accepted on the toll road from AB as those on the toll road from 
BC, thus effectively getting the same benefit as those whose AC bids 
were accepted. This result is unsurprising, as the selection situation 
is the same for both AB and BC: the toll and GP lanes are exactly the 
same; the number of vehicles on the toll is the same (from those who 
have been selected from the AC bids); and the bids are exactly the 
same (as it is the same group of travelers remaining in both cases). 
However, the first group pays 80% of the maximum bid, and the 
second group pays 70% of the maximum; thus, the group guaranteed 
complete access to the two toll road segments pays a 10% premium. 
This result could lead to complications from a game theory point of 
view because the top percentage of travelers would benefit from not 
bidding on the AC option. However, all travelers accepted on the toll 
road pay less than their VOT saved, so they would still benefit from 
the current arrangement.
Given that θ = µ means that λ + θ = λ + µ, only one of these val-
ues is shown in Figure 3. The graph shows a slight increase in the 
percentage of vehicles accepted to use the toll road as umod increases. 
As umod increases the traveler’s willingness to accept a higher price 
increases, so one might expect more vehicles to be accepted on 
the toll road, and they are. However, acceptance of more vehicles 
slows the travel time and reduces the benefit of the toll road. 
This change motivates those travelers with a higher VOT to sub-
mit lower bids. This trade-off forces the toll operator to perform, 
because of the changing bids, a balancing act between the num-
ber of cars accepted on the toll road and the amount of potential 
revenue per car.
With approximately 17% of vehicles using the toll road, travel 
time reaches just over free-flow speed (i.e., 1.00004), whereas the 
GP lane users see a 70% increase in travel time because of con-
gestion. For the hour journey of the hypothetical scenario, these 
differences mean that the toll users save 42 min for about $11.
A noticeable feature of Figure 3 is the invariance of the results—in 
both accepted toll users and in revenue obtained by the toll operator—
to extreme changes in the VOT distribution. An approximate 10% 
increase remains in both accepted toll users and revenue obtained 
between the extremes, results that are expected (if users have a lower 
average VOT lower revenues would be expected). At this stage of the 
research, the authors are not sure whether the phenomenon represents 
reality or is a consequence of the model assumptions (e.g., the use of 
a triangular distribution, which is inherently linear, like the observed 
increase in revenues). Further research is needed to determine the 
robustness of this observation to varying modeling assumptions and 
comparison with real-world data.
discussion oF applicaTion
The discussion so far has been academic in nature and, as such, 
has not considered the practical limitations of implementing such 
a toll auction mechanism. Four practical limitations come to 
mind: education, participation rates, perception, and the dead-fish 
fallacy.
Existing variable tolling mechanisms may be more intuitive than 
the one proposed here. Though the proposed bidding mechanism 
is simpler than other auction types, it is still a combinatorial auc-
tion and its mechanics might be beyond the grasp of the general 
population. From a practical perspective, the traveler must under-
stand that multiple bids happen simultaneously and correspond 
only to a certain segment or segments of the roadway network. In 
addition, placing a bid does not guarantee acceptance to the toll 
road, as only the selected top bidders gain access. In addition to 
the ubiquitous spread of V2I technology that would be required 
to implement this proposed tolling mechanism, the toll operator 
would likely need to pursue an extensive advertising and public 
relations campaign before deployment.
The current model assumes 100% participation rates, which are 
highly unlikely among the general population, especially for those 
with a low VOT. In practice, the V2I technology and tolling mech-
anism would need a component to allow for default bid values. 
These values would allow travelers to set a very minimal bid that 
they are always willing to pay for use of the toll road. The current 
optimization model does not account for this option. The impact of 
default bids on an auction-based tolling mechanism is an area for 
further study.
An auction-based system for HOT lanes could result in negative 
public perception. Ethical considerations for who has access to the 
toll or which bids are accepted constitute a hurdle for HOT imple-
mentation in general. Given that accepted bids reflect the highest 
losing bid, uninformed travelers may be skeptical of the method for 
selecting winning bids as prices constantly vary.
The authors’ final concern is that this system assumes a steady 
state because the drivers in the scenario have both perfect knowledge 
112 Transportation Research Record 2530
and a constant VOT that is not affected by the system. The authors 
specifically made these assumptions to explore the mathematical 
theorizing of a Vickrey auction tolling system, but they do not 
reflect real-world human dynamics that are constantly in flux. 
Salt calls this the dead-fish fallacy, which highlights the idea that, 
despite the nonstatic, dynamic nature of the world, scientists insist 
on assuming static behavior (28). This assumption has consequences 
on the results drawn: experimental, observational, or both. To illus-
trate this, Salt colorfully draws a parallel by noting that the only time 
that fish remain static in a pond is when they are all dead. In the case 
of a Vickrey auction tolling mechanism, the authors submit to the 
dead-fish fallacy to assume that a steady state is an approximation 
for the long-term behavior of the tolling system but not for the ini-
tial implementation term. Finally, the authors assume that travelers’ 
VOTs are not affected by the system, an assumption that may be 
unreasonable in the real world. For example, if a traveler is willing 
to pay $10 to use a toll road, but the final price consistently falls to 
$1, then might that traveler question why his or her VOT is so high? 
The market itself, and people’s own social networks, influence their 
VOT and may bring the overall revenue potential down (29). As 
technology advances to make the proposed tolling mechanism more 
feasible, more research is required to address these limitations and 
account for human heterogeneity of VOT and decision criteria to 
ensure optimal revenue and lane usage.
conclusions
This paper describes and models a tolling scenario in which auto-
motive travelers use V2I technology to participate in a Vickrey auc-
tion for access to the toll–HOT lane. Access to the toll road occurs 
at multiple points along the single facility, and travelers are able to 
make multiple bids to gain access to all or parts of the toll lane. The 
paper uses this model to explore the impact of varying the distribu-
tion of travelers’ VOT on the revenue achieved by the toll opera-
tor. This VOT was approximated with a triangular distribution for 
which mode value was the independent variable. The results indi-
cate robustness of the auction mechanism design to variation in the 
distribution of travelers’ VOT. This variation affected the revenue 
obtained by the toll operator and the number of vehicles accepted 
on the toll road, which was about 17% of the total vehicles entering 
the system.
The advantage of using V2I tolling is that the toll operator can 
dynamically adjust the toll price to ensure full utilization of the 
toll road. In the model here, however, road utilization maximizes 
the toll operators’ revenue without necessarily attempting to pro-
vide the best option for travelers. The socially optimal solution, in 
average travel time, would be to allow equal numbers of cars on 
the toll lane as the GP lane. Doing so would remove the benefit of 
using the toll lane over the GP lane and would thus disincentivize 
bidding and reduce the toll operator’s revenue to zero. Therefore, 
an incentive exists for the toll operator to keep the GP lane con-
gested, a practice that follows the old business adage of creating 
demand for one’s product. Because travelers bid on use of the 
toll road, their doing so means that their satisfaction with the toll 
operator’s acceptance strategy is implicitly included in their bid. 
This system keeps the toll operator interested only in the paying 
travelers. Those who win the Vickrey auction are the ones with the 
highest VOT (i.e., the richest). This system therefore leads to some 
embedded socioeconomic inequalities that surface through the use 
of this tolling strategy.
If this proposed system is any reflection of reality, then its 
invariance to the population’s distribution of VOT indicates that 
auction-based tolling could be an unnecessary mechanism because 
the population makeup and preferences have very little effect on 
the outcome. Traditional dynamic tolling mechanisms possibly 
perform at least as well as the Vickrey auction version, but further 
research is required to determine whether the model results presented 
here truly reflect reality.
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